Alla Normale di Pisa: la shadow-money e le banche centrali (e non...)

ECPR Joint Sessions
Scuola Normale Superiore, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna and University of Pisa

Pisa 24 - 28 April 2016

WORKSHOP 21 - AULA 6

Managing Shadow Money

China - Euro - Globalisation - Governance - Political Economy - Public Policy 

Presenter

Daniela Gabor
University of the West of England

Authors

Daniela Gabor
University of the West of England
Jakob Vestergaard
Danish Institute for International Studies

Workshop The Politics of Central Banking

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Abstract

Since the global financial crisis, it has been well established that we need to improve our understanding of shadow banking. Research has so far focused on sources of pro-cyclicality, channels of systemic contagion, and policies to mitigate shadow instability. Recently, however, scholars explored broader questions: What does the rise of shadow banking mean for monetary theory and practice? How should we change our traditional theories of money to capture the complex practices through which money is created in modern financial systems?

Pozsar (2014, 2015) argues that shadow money begins where money created by banks (deposits) ends, bringing together demand for safety from cash-rich institutional investors with demand for risk from leveraged portfolio investors. Conceptually, Pozsar’s contribution draws on a tradition in monetary theory that conceives of money as a balance sheet relationship (Minsky, 1987, Bell 2001, Mehrling 2012), with money hierarchies closely reflecting (cross-border) institutional arrangements: gold as money between central banks, reserves as money between banks, deposits as money between firms and households. Pozsar (2014) however assumes that crises matter only for private shadow ‘moneyness’ and that the US-based shadow banking is analytically representative for the entire (shadow) banking universe. These assumptions downplay important questions of national (and supranational) economic management in an era of financial globalization, overlook connections and potential conflicts between fiscal, monetary and macroprudential policies.

In addressing these issues, we draw upon and contribute to the money view literature (Mehrling 2012, Merhling et al 2013, Pozsar 2014, 2015). Noting that shadow banking (or market-based finance) is distinctive from relationship banking in that debt relationships are typically organized via marketable financial instruments, we define shadow money as repo liabilities supported by tradable collateral. We outline the constraints governing the creation of shadow money and examine the specific mechanisms through which these constraints may (de)stabilize money hierarchies.

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Sindrome di Torfason: anche la BCE non pubblica i flussi di cassa

"Sindrome di Torfason"*: anche la BCE non pubblica i flussi di cassa


Dopo aver segnalato come la Banca Nazionale Svizzera ha omesso di indicare i flussi di cassa nel bilancio 2015, notiamo che anche la BCE - CONTRAVVENENDO AI PRINCIPI CONTABILI INTERNAZIONALI - si auto-autorizza ad escludere la redazione del rendiconto dei flussi di cassa dal suo bilancio del 2015. Infatti, a pag. 29 della relazione annuale presentata nel 2016, leggiamo:

Altre informazioni

In considerazione del ruolo svolto dalla BCE quale banca centrale, il Comitato esecutivo ritiene che la pubblicazione del rendiconto sui flussi di cassa non fornirebbe informazioni aggiuntive di rilievo.

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/annrep/ar2015annualaccounts_it.pdf

D'altra parte cosa dovevamo aspettarci ? E' la stessa BCE che ci informa della violazione rituale dei principi contabili da parte delle banche centrali.

Nell'occasional paper della BCE n. 169 del 5 aprile 2016

( https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbop169.en.pdf ) , intitolato “Profit distribution and loss coverage rule for central banks”, si legge:

a pagina 20:
“No single accounting framework is consistently applied by the majority of central banks. However, there are four main frameworks or types: the Eurosystem framework, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), local (national) Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and central bank specific (own) rules. A central bank can also apply “IFRS with exceptions” (17), or national GAAP with exceptions.”

e, nella nota 17 della stessa pagina:
“Strictly speaking, since IFRS does not allow for exceptions or for industry-specific rules, such an arrangement is not IFRS-conformant.”  (e quindi anche non-conforme alle GAAP.)

http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbop169.en.pdf

* La definizione Sindrome di Torfason deriva da uno studio pubblicato nel 2014 dove si rivelava come le banche - che basano l'accesso al credito sullo studio dei flussi di cassa della clientela - nel loro caso fanno una eccezione e li ignorano poiché le banche non registrano correttamente la creazione di denaro nei loro libri contabili:

Cash Flow Accounting in Banks— A study of practice, Ásgeir B. Torfason, University of Gothenburg, 2014
https://gupea.ub.gu.se/handle/2077/35272